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Status Conditions of Self-Evaluation
1. Introduction
To Cooley's looking-glass self it made no real difference in whose 
mirror the self was reflected. The "mirror" had somehow to be accepted 
by the actor as a source of evaluations, but neither in Cooley nor in 
subsequent research and theory based on Cooley has there been much con­
cern for the sociological character of the source in relationship to 
the self. While it is fair to object that Cooley very often was talking 
about the reflection of the parent in the child, in formulating his 
hypothesis he did not incorporate any specific idea of who the source 
might be:
There is no sense of ׳1׳ , as in pride or shame, without its 
correlative sense of you, or he, or they. . . .  In a very 
large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes 
the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's 
self . . . appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self­
feeling one has is determined by the attitude towards this 
attributed to that other mind. A social self of this sort might 
be called the reflected or looking-glass self:. . . .  A self­
idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the 
imagination of our appearance, to the other person; the 
imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort 
of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification.^
The sociological character of the "other" in this hypothesis is left
2vague, and it has typically remained so in efforts to verify the hypothesis.
Because the other is so vaguely characterized, it is possible to 
suppose from Cooley's hypothesis that professors are as much influenced 
by what students think of them as by what their colleagues think. In 
fact, in Zetterberg's theory of compliance, a theory in which Cooley's 
hypothesis plays a central role, it is even possible to suppose that 
professors are more influenced by what students think than students are
influenced by what professors think. For Zetterberg derives the result 
that the higher the self-evaluation, the greater the conformity to the 
opinions of others, a result possible only because the status of the 
"others" who are sources of evaluation is neglected. Not only is the 
result implausible on its face, it is contrary to fact. If experimental 
subjects are made to believe they are very competent at some task, they 
are more resistant to influence from others than if they are made to 
believe they are incompetent; and how much influence others exert on them
4is a function of how competent they believe the other is.
That it is important to know the social status of the "others" in 
whom the self is reflected is not a new idea. Status was a prominent 
condition both in Speier's analysis of the conferral of honor^ and
£
Garfinkle's analysis of the conferral of dishonor . But neither paper has 
had the impact on subsequent theory and research that it deserves. Both 
papers made a fundamental contribution, in both papers the contribution 
was the same, and in both papers the contribution was of two sorts: First, 
both insisted that evaluation had not only a source but also a public. 
Neither honor nor dishonor could be successfully conferred if not conferred 
before witnesses. But second, Speier and Garfinkle did more than complicate 
the cast of characters and thicken the plot: They defined the source as 
a person having a special kind of social status. In Speier status conferral 
was illustrated by the way in which a sovereign confers honor on a subject. 
His emphasis was placed on the fact that the sovereign's power to bestow 
honor is a capacity vested in the status of sovereign, as distinct from 
the individual who for the moment plays the sovereign's part. In Garfinkle, 
status conditions had an even more central place in the theory. Virtually
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the whole analysis concentrated on the kind of status that characterizes 
a figure who has a legitimate right to confer dishonor on others.
Though by now quite old, the contributions made by Speier and Garfinkle 
have not been assimilated into theory or research on self-evaluation, and 
it is our purpose to bring about this assimilation here. The two ideas to 
be assimilated are, first, that a public as well as a source is somehow 
important in self-evaluation; and second, that the part played by "others" 
in the process depends on their status. The first step in assimilating 
these two ideas will be to explicate the original theoretical notions of 
Cooley, Speier, and Garfinkle, including the role of the public witness.
Once rendered sufficiently precisely, it will be possible to study the way 
in which status conditions determine roles in the process of self-evalua­
tion as Cooley, Speier, and Garfinkle understand it. Finally, having 
studied the status conditions of the process, it becomes possible to derive 
some interesting implications for those social situations in which evalua­
tions take place but the necessary status conditions are not satisfied.
2. Explication of the Process of Self-Evaluation.
As a foundation for the study of the role of status conditions in 
self-evaluation, it is useful first to explicate the ideas of Cooley,
Speier, and Garfinkle about the self, source, and public witness. Like 
most explications, the result will not be a full and complete rendering of 
the original ideas of all three men.^ In three important respects our 
formulation is more limited than either Cooley or much later research.
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First, we do not propose to encompass all aspects of self-conception.
O
Much research in the Cooley tradition has been concerned with self-image, 
with questions such as: How is it that a "scholar" comes to see himself 
in terms of such characteristics as his knowledge of the field, his 
ability to attract and train students, or his standing in the scientific 
community? How, for that matter, does one come to think of oneself as a 
"scholar"? Neither question is dealt with in the present paper. What 
we are concerned with is evaluation of the characteristics one believes 
oneself to possess. If one is a scholar, and believes research is important 
to sustain the image of scholar, how good is that research? This is the 
only question we ask.
But evaluations may range from the global to the specific. For 
example, Rosenberg's well-known self-esteem scale uses items such as ״On the 
whole, I am satisfied with myself" or "All in all, I am inclined to feel
9
that I am a failure." But a man may be a success or failure "in general," 
or only in specific ways in specific contexts. Jones may be a great 
sociologist who is a failure at cocktail conversation, or a poor sociologist 
superb at cocktail conversation. It may be an important problem to decide 
which ability will determine his answer to questions like ״On the whole, I 
am satisfied with myself" but this is the kind of question we do not ask 
in the present paper. Rather, we are concerned with specific evaluations 
in specific social contexts; we ask how a man who is a scholar knows that 
his research is good, not how he knows that "on the whole" he is good.
Finally, evaluations may be regarded objectively or subjectively.
Where evaluations made by others are clear and unambiguous there may be 
little difference, but often there is a difference between actual and
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perceived evaluations and when this occurs it is apparently the latter 
that have the higher correlation with self-evaluation.10 In any case, it 
is with perceived evaluation that we are concerned in the present paper.
It is a fundamental problem of the theory of self-evaluation to determine 
how objective evaluation determines subjective evaluation. We do not want 
to create a solipsistic theory about selves whose evaluations bear no 
relation to how others actually regard them. But for the present, we regard 
evaluations made by others from the perspective of the person who is being 
evaluated, whatever they may prove to be objectively.
Thus, we are concerned in this paper with evaluations, emotions such 
as pride, shame, respect, admiration, or deprecation. These evaluations 
are made only of specific characteristics, such as mechanical aptitude, 
musical taste, or mathematical ability. And, if the actor from whose point 
of view the situation is regarded is called p, the formulation we give here 
is p-centric; that is, evaluations are regarded from p's perspective.
For the sake of simplifying the expression of our theory, we will 
treat the characteristics of actors as if they were dichotomous. Thus, if 
C is some characteristic, say intelligence, we treat C as if it had only 
two states, C or C . Of course, if intelligence were measured by IQ scores,
cL D
it might in fact range from 0 to over 200. We make no claim that all 
characteristics are "really" dichotomous, but for the sake of convenience 
we would divide this range at some suitable cutting point into "high" or 
"low" states.
Now consider just those actors who have a legitimate right to evaluate 
p with respect to the characteristic C. This notion will define for us the
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social context within which evaluation takes place. Unfortunately, it is 
not at all as simple a notion as it sounds. Consider p a learned scholar.
The number of people who have a right to evaluate his scholarship is fairly 
large: graduate students, peers, the famous names of his field, all count. 
But not everyone counts, not even everyone about whose opinion he cares.
His family, his neighbors, his nonprofessional friends, may all hold the 
opinion that he is a famous scholar, but he does not give them the right to 
evaluate his ability: he does not typically say to them, ״Read what I have 
written and form an opinion of it." What they know is his reputation; what 
they evaluate are the symbols of his success, his style of life, the ambiance 
they sense as they observe his colleagues' response to him. Thus, they 
evaluate indirectly rather than directly his state of C.
But the difficulty lies deeper. For one might reasonably object that 
students of p are no more able to evaluate than some of his friends, yet 
they are included among those who have a right to evaluate him. In two 
ways p's students differ from his family, friends, and neighbors. First, 
by virtue of their status they must eventually form opinions with respect 
to C, for they themselves possess some state of that same characteristic.
One may say that they are part of the same professional community, and the 
same community of evaluators, simply because they are evaluating and being 
evaluated with respect to the same characteristics as p. Second, belonging 
to the same professional community as p, they know on whose judgment p's 
reputation was based, and how much that judgment is supposed to be worth. 
Family, friends and neighbors may know p has a reputation, even what that 
reputation is, but they do not know how it was formed or by whom. They are
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altogether outside the community in which the evaluations were made. They 
cannot assess the reputation directly, and p would be most upset if they 
tried.
Thus, we distinguish between those who have some right to evaluate p 
with respect to C and those who do not. Among those who have a right to 
evaluate, there may be great differences in their actual capacity to 
evaluate. A source of evaluations is an actor, say o, who p believes is 
more capable of evaluating states of C than is p himself.
Definition 1. 0 is a source for p with respect to C if and
only if p believes o is more capable than p of 
evaluating C.
The basis of o's superior ability might be either that o is a better 
judge or that o has greater access to objective standards of evaluation. 
Some men are better judges of intelligence, art, or wit than others; or 
at least there are people who believe them to be better. Some differ 
simply in possessing an objective standard that p himself does not. For 
example in Sherif's expectation experiments, adolescent boys are made to 
throw a ball at a target that is covered by denim; only the experimenter 
knows where the ball actually hits, because the experimenter can see an 
electric-sensing device that the boyscannot. The experimenter obviously 
has a greater capacity to evaluate. But his greater capacity lies not so 
much in any ability he possesses as in his privileged access to an objec­
tive criterion of performance.^
While sources have a greater capacity to evaluate than p, p's equals 
have the same capacity as p himself at evaluating states of C.
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values are not positive or negative, only present or absent; the opposite 
of acceptance is not rejection, but only non-acceptance. Hence negative 
reference groups play no part in our formulation. As a matter of notation, 
we will refer to relations by using ordered pairs of letters, such as po 
or qo. The pair po means the relation of p to o, the pair qo means the 
relation of q to o. These relations are, of course, as seen from p's point 
of view, so that qo in fact means how p sees the relation of q to o.
Observe that pq is a different relation than qp.
In Cooley, the relation of p to o is always assumed to be positive, 
in the sense that p is assumed to accept o as a source. Given this accep­
tance relation, Cooley's hypothesis is that the evaluation of p' by o 
determines the evaluation of p' by p. By "determines" we mean that the 
sign of the pp' relation will be the same as that of the op' relation. If 
op' is positive, pp' will be positive, and if op' is negative, pp' will be 
negative.
Assumption 1. (Cooley Hypothesis) If p accepts o as
a source, op' determines pp'.
Two Cooley situations are shown in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
In Speier and Garfinkle, the relation of q to the source is also 
always assumed to be positive, and when this is true the sign of op' also 
determines the sign of qp'. That is, q is treated by Speier and Garfinkle 
in much the same way as Cooley treats p; evaluations of p are reflections 
of the evaluations made by the source.
Figure 1. The Cooley Hypothesis. Given that p accepts o as 
a source, then the sign of p to p' is determined by (will 
have the same sign as) the sign of o to p'. Directed braces 
represent acceptance relations, while signed-directed line- 
segments represent evaluations.
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Assumption 2 . (Speier-Garfinkle Hypothesis) If q accepts
o as a source, the sign of op' determines 
the sign of qp'.
Two Speier-Garfinkle effects are shown in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here
If q's evaluation of p simply reflects that of o, one might suppose 
that it is superfluous. Certainly it should be less effective than o's 
evaluation in determining pp', for if p were in doubt about the sign of 
pp' the information that qp' was positive would not much reassure him; 
after all, q is no more competent to evaluate than p. Nevertheless, q 
plays an important role in self-evaluation. By evaluating p before witnes­
ses, o makes not only an evaluation but a reputation. This reputation is 
carried by those who constantly associate with p, and in their every action 
p sees a reflection of the evaluation made by o. This has little to do with 
determining the sign of pp', which has already been determined, but it has 
a great deal to do with its stability. Without consensual validation, self- 
evaluations are fragile, subject to continual pressure to change or fluctu­
ate. (For example, if others are not in agreement about their evaluation
13of p', the self is less resistant to experimentally induced change. )
But one can seldom rely on o to repeat op'. Sources do not confer honor 
(or dishonor) every day. In any case, sources are (in both Speier and 
Garfinkle) typically socially distant from p and therefore very infrequent 
associates of p. But p's equals are fairly constant associates, and if 
they have absorbed and carry his reputation, making it apparent in every
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Figure 2. The Speier-Garfinkle Effect. P ׳s equals witness 
the evaluation of the self made by the source, and their own 
evaluations are determined by the source.
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interaction with p, the sign of pp' should be stable. In this sense, 
stable self-evaluation depends as much on evaluations by equals as by 
sources.
From the view just expressed, what is most important for stable self- 
evaluation is that the people p accepts as equals evaluate p' in the same 
manner as sources evaluate p 1. Hence,
Assumption 3. (Stability Hypothesis) If p accepts o^, 0 2 ,
... as sources and q^, q.,... as equals, 
then pp1 is stable if and only if all 
evaluations op' and qp' have the same sign.
Note that we have not used the expression "witness" in Assumption 3, despite 
the fact that we are attempting to explicate the idea of "witness" in 
Speier and Garfinkle. There is no reason to take the term "witness" 
literally, since not all witnesses will be accepted by p as equals and 
not all carriers of p's reputation will actually have witnessed o's evalua­
tion of p in the literal sense. Two illustrations of stable self-evalua­
tion are shown in Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3 here
But can only equals validate the self? Couldn't those people who are 
less capable than p himself at evaluating C nevertheless be witnesses of 
the evaluations made by the source? And if they could be witnesses of the 
source's evaluation, could they not carry reputations quite as well as any­
body else? In certain circumstances it seems reasonable to suppose so. 
Nevertheless, these circumstances are limited by the fact that p is himself 
capable of being a source for his juniors. If they become dependent on p
Figure 3. Stable Self-Evaluations. An equal with whom p 
frequently interacts is crucial to the evaluation process. 
When q ’s evaluation of p 1 has been determined by the same 
source as p's, the consistency of the two has the effect of 
maintaining the stability of self-evaluations.
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for evaluations, he acquires the power to manipulate what they believe. 
Their evaluations, in that case, might simply be reflections of what £ 
would like to believe, rather than the source's evaluations. Furthermore, 
he will be able to determine for them who they should accept as his source. 
While all this sounds as if it were in p's own interest, assuming him to 
be ego-defensive, it is not. Surely p's real difficulty is to obtain 
reliable and capable judgments on which he can depend with certainty. In 
any other case he is plagued with self-doubt. Juniors may very well be 
able to validate the source's evaluations, but only to the degree that 
they are independent of p. Where they are in no way subordinates of p, 
their reflections of the source's evaluations should play the same role 
as the reputations carried by equals.
3. Status Conditions and Stable Self-Evaluation.
In the present state of the theory of self-evaluation, its applica­
tions are limited to situations in which one has already identified whom 
p has accepted as a source, whom p has accepted as an equal, and whom p's 
equals have accepted as a source. For if p does not accept o as a source, 
or p does not accept q as an equal, or q does not accept o as a source, no
exact and definite predictions are possible from the theory so far formu- 
14lated. But we have no theoretical grounds for saying when p or q will 
accept o as a source or p accept q as an equal. These conditions were 
simply taken as given. Hence our purpose in this section must be to pro­
vide some grounds for stating who will be a source and who an equal. If
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we can accomplish this purpose it will markedly strengthen the predictive 
power of the theory.
In approaching this problem we continue to build on the suggestions 
made by Speier and Garfinkle. Both located the relevant conditions in 
the status relationships of p, o, and q. In Speier it was because o is 
always a status superior of p and q that the bearer of honor, p, feels so 
honored and the public, q, feels so compelled to pay that honor. In 
Garfinkle, the degrading of p was "successful" because o is always a 
public representative of the moral community, one who more than others 
represents the positive moral force of the social structure, one who in 
effect is a moral superior of both p and q. If we are correctly interpret­
ing the role of the public in the process, the status of q is also im­
portant. For to be so constant an associate of p, and for its evaluations 
to mean anything to p, the relevant public must be the public accepted by 
p as status equals. Therefore the conditions that predict the roles 
people will play in the evaluation process are status conditions. Hence 
in the present section we will define such terms as status-characteristic, 
and status class, and formulate in terms of them sufficient conditions of 
acceptance as a source or an equal.
In this section, we will be largely concerned with the kind of 
characteristics, such as education or occupation, the states of which are
(1) evaluated; (2) associated with specific abilities of various kinds; and 
(3) associated with general expectations.^"*
In this context, the sort of evaluation we mean is the sort usually 
connoted by status honor, or status value. That is, it carries the meaning
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of worth, esteem, prestige, or some synonym of these terms. Thus, it is 
better to be white than blue collar, in the sense that the former has 
more prestige.
Not only evaluations, but also specific abilities may be attached to 
the states of certain characteristics. Specific abilities, of course, 
may be directly attributed to actors, like p, but they may also be attri­
buted to the states of such characteristics as age, sex, occupation, 
education and race. That is, because p possesses state Dx of character­
istic D people may expect him to possess also state Cx of characteristic 
C. Because he is a professor, he may be expected to be articulate. Two 
such states (professor, articulate) are said to be associated.
Not only specific abilities (such as the ability to solve mathematical 
puzzles, cure automobiles of their ills, etc.) but also general abilities 
may be associated with the states of some characteristic. Thus, some 
people may expect that people in white collar occupations are competent, 
intelligent, well-mannered, etc. These more diffuse expectations we will 
call general expectation states, (GES).
A characteristic that has all three of these properties we call a 
diffuse status characteristic, D.
Definition 3 . A characteristic D is a diffuse status
characteristic if and only if
(1) the states of D are differentially status­
valued, and
(2) to each state, x, of D there is associated 
a distinct set Yx of evaluated states of 
specific characteristics, and
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(3) to each state, x, of D there is associated 
a distinct general expectation state, GES , 
having the same evaluation as the state DX .
X
Thus, education is a status-characteristic if people believe that 
college-educated people are "better" than those who never completed high 
school, if they think that college-educated people are likely to be cleaner, 
more verbal, more mathematical (just as possible examples of some elements 
of Y)> and if they believe college-educated people are more intelligent.
Of course, a given characteristic might be a status characteristic in one 
social context and not in another. This is not only a matter of some 
people just not believing in the expectations associated with states of D, 
which of course is possible; there is also the fact that characteristics 
are in some contexts specific and in others diffuse or general. Thus, the 
epithet "dirty" sometimes means quite specifically that one is not clean, 
but in expressions like "dirty Mexican" it means rather more than that.
A set of actors who possess a given state of D form a status class. 
Professors are a status class; students are another. A set of status 
classes defined by a single status characteristic are in this paper called 
a status structure. As it is possible to have no state of some charact- 
istic D, it is possible to be outside a status structure altogether.
For example, a professor‘s parents may be regarded as not having any 
position in the status structure of a university.
P possesses a number of different status characteristics (occupation, 
education, race, age, sex, ...), some of which are significant in some 
situations, some in others. There is no reason to believe that any one 
status characteristic is significant in all situations, nor even that there
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is any one situation in which all status characteristics are significant at 
the same time. In those situations where the status characteristic D does 
determine the conceptions p holds of himself and others, we will say that 
D is activated. What this means is that in the particular situation the 
individuals are seen as possessing the properties of the status class Dx 
to which they belong. For example, if p is a medical intern, and believes 
that o knows more than himself about differential diagnosis because o is a 
senior resident, we speak of the medical status structure as activated in 
this particular instance.
We are going to assume that the roles played by individuals in evalua­
tion situations are structured and determined by the status-characteristics 
activated in those situations. Therefore it is important for us to state 
when given status characteristics are activated, since this is equivalent 
to stating the conditions under which the process we are describing will 
take place. We believe the process to take place under the following 
circumstances. First, it takes place when p is required to perform some 
activity or function, such as making a decision, solving a problem, execut­
ing an instruction, manufacturing some product, which collectively we may 
refer to as the performance of task T. Second, this task requires that p 
possess some particular characteristic, say C, some state of which is 
instrumental to success in performing T. Third, p is in some doubt about 
which state he possesses of the characteristic C. We may speak of a 
situation that has these three properties as a situation of evaluational 
concern.
What status characteristics do for p is to provide some basis for 
inferring who is capable of evaluating whom with respect to the character­
istic C. Not every characteristic is useful to p in this respect. Those 
that are, that is those that provide a basis for inferences about C, are 
said to be relevant to C. D is relevant to C in the first instance if D is 
associated with C. For example, status in the medical hierarchy is associ­
ated with diagnostic ability; it may therefore be used as a basis of infer­
ring competence to evaluate a diagnosis. Note that inversions count among 
the characteristics associated with D: That is, if it is supposed that 
nurses, because they are nurses, are more likely to show the patient tender 
loving care, while Chiefs of Medicine are less likely to, TLC as well as 
diagnostic ability is associated with status in the medical hierarchy.
Even if D is not associated with C it may provide p with some basis 
for making inferences about C. It will be relevant to C in those cases where, 
given a situation of evaluational concern, D is not dissociated from C and 
there is no other basis of inference about C known to p. Two characteristics 
are dissociated when p knows that one cannot infer the state of one from 
the state of the other. If p believes that some Chiefs of Medicine are 
athletic, while others are not, and in particular that a Chief is about as 
likely to be athletic as an intern, then medical status and athletic ability 
are dissociated. This situation must be clearly distinguished from situa­
tions in which p does not know whether two characteristics are associated or 
not. Thus, p may never have heard of contrast sensitivity before (naturally 
enough, since we have just invented it); and not having heard of it, may be 
in some doubt as to how it is related to medical status. In this case,
־17־
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contrast sensitivity is not associated with D, but equally is not dissociated. 
There are, in other words, three possible relations of D to C: associated, 
not associated, and dissociated. Now, if D and C are not associated but 
not dissociated, D will become relevant to C if there is pressure to 
evaluate states of C and no basis other than D to provide p with information 
about abilities. D still provides some basis for inference because it is 
associated with general expectation states. Chiefs of medicine are better 
than interns at all sorts of things, the GES assures the intern, and pro­
viding he has no information to the contrary (such as would be provided if 
D were dissociated from C) he may generalize from GES, establishing the 
relevance of D to a new characteristic C. This will of course not occur 
if there is a firmer basis of inference about C; if, for example, p knows 
that sex is associated with contrast sensitivity. But in the absence of any 
other basis of inference, D becomes relevant to C if not dissociated from it.
We may speak of a situation of evaluational concern, S, as socially 
structured by the characteristic D if D is activated in S and relevant to 
C. If S is socially structured by D we reason as follows: if p believes 
that D is a status characteristic, so that in his eyes certain specific 
and general expectations are associated with states of D; and D is 
activated in some setting in which such specific and general expectations 
come to be attributed to p, o, and q; and D is relevant to C; then the roles 
of o and q in the evaluational process should not be in doubt. For given D, 
then the p, o, q structure is so defined that the relative capacities of 
each to evaluate the other are well understood. For o to be a source for p 
all we require is that there be a positive status differential in favor of o.
That is, o must be the status superior of p with respect to D. Furthermore, 
o will be a source for q if the same status differential exists between o 
and q and the same evaluational concern exists for q as for p. We may 
reasonably suppose the same situation to be of evaluational concern for q 
if q is required in some way to evaluate p and is in doubt about his ability 
to do so. Finally, p will regard q as his status equal with respect to C 
if they are status equals with respect to D. Thus, given S structured with
16 ״respect to D,
(3.1) P accepts o as a source with respect to C if o is a status 
superior of p with respect to D;
(3.2) Q accepts o as a source with respect to C if o is a status 
superior of q with respect to D;
(3.3) P accepts q as an equal with respect to C if q is a status 
equal of p with respect to D;
which follow from definitions 1, 2, and 3.
For a given o and q, results 3.1 -3.3 are sufficient to determine the 
sign of the po, qo, and pq relations, and therefore are sufficient to deter­
mine the process through which the sign and stability of self-evaluation 
are determined. For if all three are satisfied, the po, pq, and qo rela­
tions are all positive; in which case, the antecedent conditions in 
assumptions 1-3 are all satisfied; in which case, the self-evaluation of 
p obeys the Cooley-Speier-Garfinkle laws, and we have our main result,
(3.4) (Structured Evaluation Theorem) Let D determine the social 
structure of S, and let o be the status superior of status 
equals p and q. Then
(1) if o evaluates p, pp1 and qp' are determined, and
(2) the sign of pp' is stable,
which follows from 3.1-3.3 and assumptions 1-3. What 3.4 says
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Insert Figure 4 here
is that status characteristics define social situations in such a way that 
beliefs about who is competent to evaluate whom are established by them. 
They therefore provide p with some basis for believing that certain actors 
are sources and others are equals. Where p in fact believes in D as a 
status characteristic, and D is activated and relevant to C, predicting 
the self-evaluation of p should prove no problem for the theory of self- 
evaluation. For the competence to evaluate p with respect to C is deter­
mined by D; therefore, o's evaluation of p determines both pp' and qp'; 
and the sign of pp' is stable, if pp' and qp1 are determined by the same 
source.
4. Social Sources of Unstable Self-Evaluation.
Given just p, o, and q and the status-characteristic D, evaluations 
take place in a clearly-structured situation, the process of evaluation 
is well-determined, and our main result, 3.4, assures that the outcome, 
pp', is stable. But the status structure D consists not just of the 
individuals p, o, and q, but of a whole class of individuals at each state 
Dx • Hence p may have more than one status superior, and from the point 
of view of D they will all be equally acceptable sources. If they are 
equally acceptable sources, for pp' to be stable the sources must agree 
in their evaluation of p. For it follows from Assumption 3 that
Figure 4. Status Conditions Determine the Sign and Stability
of Self-Evaluation. If D is the higher and the lower
state of D, then o is a status superior and q a status equal of p.
Therefore the acceptance of o as a source and q as an equal in
evaluating C is determined. If these relations are determined,
the evaluation o makes of p will be accepted by p and q, and 
the sign of pp1 will be stable.
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(4.1) If p accepts two or more sources equally, then
they agree in their evaluation of p or pp' is 
unstable.
Thus, if Doe is a student of mathematics, he can hardly develop a stable 
view of himself if he is told by Professor Jones that he has a promising 
future (which Jones says because of the elegance of Doe's proofs) but is 
told by Professor Smith that he had best find another career (which Smith 
says because Doe's problems are trivial). Stable self-evaluation depends 
on consensus among sources, who must share the same standards of evaluation.
But (4.1) holds only if all sources are equally acceptable; in other 
words, it assumes that there is no internal structure within the status 
class Dx . Obviously there are various ways in which p might regard some 
sources as more acceptable than others, even though they are alike with 
respect to D. First, they may possess different states of some other 
diffuse status characteristic, such as age or sex. Second, even if they 
do not differ in such characteristics as age or sex, which have very 
general status significance, they may differ with respect to character­
istics that have a particular status-significance within the status 
structure D. Thus, from some points of view all officers are officers, 
but some were commissioned at West Point while others hold ROTC 
commissions. Third, each individual source may be characterized by a 
reputation attached to his particular name. Names, for those who know 
the internal structure of the class Dx , behave like status-characteristics 
for the simple reason that they are status-characteristics. That is, 
they satisfy definition 3; they have prestige, are associated with 
specific abilities, and imply general expectation states. Suppose Jones
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has more prestige than Smith, is particularly talented in abstract 
algebra, and is more brilliant than Smith, who is well known in 
numerical analysis but something of a plodder. If such a structure 
exists, and if it is known to p, it defines clearly which source is 
superior and resolves those doubts about the self which dissensus among 
sources otherwise creates (see figure 5); in which case 3.4 holds as before.
Insert Figure 5 here
But knowledge of a structure that depends on recognition of personal 
names is more doubtful than one that depends on status classes, and there 
is much greater room in such a structure for dissensus about the compet­
ence of sources. Reputations are continually being formed, altered, 
replaced; their transmission is much less dependable than the trans­
mission of attitudes that are, after all, part of the common Culture; 
and a great deal depends on the sort of communication processes developed 
within the status class Dx • In any case, if there is dissensus among 
sources about standards, there is probably also dissensus among others 
about the reputation of sources. But agreement between p and q about 
sources is necessary to the stability of self-evaluation. For assumption 
3 implies that
(4.2) Given dissensus among sources, if p accepts
q as an equal, then pp' is unstable if p 
and q accept different sources.
(See figure 6.)
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Figure 5. Stability of Self-Evaluation and Consensus Among Sources. 
If p accepts both o^ and 0£ as sources, p will some of the time 
believe he is good with respect to C and some of the time believe 
he is poor. The result is an unstable self-evaluation. However, 
if one of the sources has a higher reputation than the other, 
reputations will behave in the same manner as status-character- 
istics, determining acceptance as a source. The Structured 
Evaluation Theorem will therefore apply; pp' is determined and 
stable.
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Insert Figure 6 here
Of course, if p did not accept q then q's evaluations would have no 
great significance. Hence pp' would be stable if p accepted only that 
q who accepted p's accepted source. There is presumably some pressure on 
p to do this, because unstable self-evaluation probably creates anxiety 
due to self-doubt. Furthermore, there is some pressure on p also to 
accept any q who does accept p's accepted source. For in the absence of 
some structural characteristic, such as D, the choice of a particular 
source requires social support. Status-characteristics provide social 
support for accepted sources because they are transmitted and maintained 
by the social groups of which p is a member. They are continually defined 
and redefined in normal social interaction. An individual choice of a 
source is a much more doubtful matter; but some support for that choice 
is assured if p accepts as equals those others who accept his accepted 
source. (See figure 7.)
Insert Figure 7 here
Thus, dissensus among sources creates pressures for the emergence of 
mutually exclusive subsets of actors within the class Dx , each forming 
an evaluational clique. Within each clique there is consensus about 
sources; between each clique there is dissensus about sources. The 
pressure of the strain due to instability pushes out of each clique any
Figure 6. Stability of Self-evaluation and Consensus 
among equals. If p accepts o, as a source but not o2 , 
stability of pp1 depends on p s equals, q^ and q2> also 
accepting only o^ as a source. If one of them accepts o2 
but not o■^ , self-evaluation is unstable if p continues 
to accept q.
Figure 7. Formation of Evaluational Cliques. If 
there is dissensus about criteria of evaluation 
among sources, stability of self-evaluation is 
maintained only by the formation of mutually exclusive 
subsets of sources and equals, within each of which all 
acceptance bonds are positive, but between which there 
are no acceptance bonds. Above, p, o^, q^ form one 
subset, while 0 £ and q2 form another. Because p does 
not accept evaluations from the c^q^ subset, they have 
no affect on his self-evaluation which depends entirely 
on o^ and q^.
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equal who does not accept the source accepted within the clique; the 
pressure of doubt about the acceptability of sources draws into each 
clique any equal who does accept the source accepted within ;he clique. 
Providing that the sources accepted within each clique theriselves share 
common standards of evaluation, the result of this decomposition of is 
the stability of self-evaluation. For
(4.3) Pp1 is determined and stable if D is decomposed into
two or more mutually exclusive, consensual subsets such that
(1) within each subset all acceptance bonds exist, while 
between each subset no acceptance bonds exist, and
(2) within each subset all sources share common standards 
of evaluation.
This result follows naturally from 3.4, providing that (1) p does not 
accept those sources who disagree with the source he accepts, and (2) all 
the q's accepted by p as equals accept only the source he accepts. For 
in that case all evaluations accepted by p will have the same sign and 3.4 
will hold. (If there is consensus among all sources in there is no 
reason why this structure should not consist of just one evaluational 
clique.)
Thus, we find that dissensus among sources generates evaluational 
clinques within D^, if we assume that unstable self-evaluation is a strain, 
that not accepting a source or equal diminishes the significance of their 
evaluations, and acceptance of sources requires social support. We have 
treated this structure as an emerging structure, but of course it might 
from p's point of view already have formed. P would then have found his 
place in one of the evaluational cliques by a process of differencial 
association, instead of having created it de novo. Once formed, the
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the structure of evaluational cliques is an equivalent of the status 
structure D, in the sense that the cliques behave like D and have the same 
consequences as D. The pressure to create them, therefore, may be thought 
of as essentially a pressure to create some equivalent of the status 
structure D within status classes.
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